During the past 50 years, U.S. leadership in space activities has benefited the global
economy, enhanced our national security, strengthened international relationships,
advanced scientific discovery, and improved our way of life.
Space capabilities provide the United States and our allies unprecedented advantages in
national decision-making, military operations, and homeland security. Space systems
provide national security decision-makers with unfettered global access and create a
decision advantage by enabling a rapid and tailored response to global challenges.
Moreover, space systems are vital to monitoring strategic and military developments as
well as supporting treaty monitoring and arms control verification. Space systems are
also critical in our ability to respond to natural and man-made disasters and monitor long-
term environmental trends. Space systems allow people and governments around the
world to see with clarity, communicate with certainty, navigate with accuracy, and
operate with assurance.
Maintaining the benefits afforded to the United States by space is central to our national
security, but an evolving strategic environment increasingly challenges U.S. space
advantages. Space, a domain that no nation owns but on which all rely, is becoming
increasingly congested, contested, and competitive. These challenges, however, also
present the United States with opportunities for leadership and partnership. Just as the
United States helped promote space security in the 20th century, we will build on this
foundation to embrace the opportunities and address the challenges of this century.
The National Security Space Strategy charts a path for the next decade to respond to the
current and projected space strategic environment. Leveraging emerging opportunities
will strengthen the U.S. national security space posture while maintaining and enhancing
the advantages the United States gains from space.
Our strategy requires active U.S. leadership enabled by an approach that updates,
balances, and integrates all of the tools of U.S. power. The Department of Defense
(DoD) and the Intelligence Community (IC), in coordination with other departments and
agencies, will implement this strategy by using it to inform planning, programming,
acquisition, operations, and analysis.
“The now-ubiquitous and interconnected nature of space capabilities
and the world’s growing dependence on them mean that irresponsible
acts in space can have damaging consequences for all of us.”
- 2010 National Space Policy
Space is vital to U.S. national security and our ability to understand emerging threats,
project power globally, conduct operations, support diplomatic efforts, and enable global
economic viability. As more nations and non-state actors recognize these benefits and
seek their own space or counterspace capabilities, we are faced with new opportunities
and new challenges in the space domain.
The current and future strategic environment is driven by three trends – space is
becoming increasingly congested, contested, and competitive.
Space is increasingly congested. Growing global space activity and testing of China’s
destructive anti-satellite (ASAT) system have increased congestion in important areas in
space. DoD tracks approximately 22,000 man-made objects in orbit, of which 1,100 are
active satellites (see Figure 1). There may be as many as hundreds of thousands of
additional pieces of debris that are too small to track with current sensors. Yet these
smaller pieces of debris can damage satellites in orbit.
Space is vital to U.S. national security and our ability to understand emerging threats,
project power globally, conduct operations, support diplomatic efforts, and enable global
economic viability. As more nations and non-state actors recognize these benefits and
seek their own space or counterspace capabilities, we are faced with new opportunities
and new challenges in the space domain.
The current and future strategic environment is driven by three trends – space is
becoming increasingly congested, contested, and competitive.
Space is increasingly congested. Growing global space activity and testing of China’s
destructive anti-satellite (ASAT) system have increased congestion in important areas in
space. DoD tracks approximately 22,000 man-made objects in orbit, of which 1,100 are
active satellites (see Figure 1). There may be as many as hundreds of thousands of
additional pieces of debris that are too small to track with current sensors. Yet these
smaller pieces of debris can damage satellites in orbit.
Today’s space environment contrasts with earlier days of the space age in which only a
handful of nations needed to be concerned with congestion. Now there are approximately
60 nations and government consortia that own and operate satellites, in addition to
numerous commercial and academic satellite operators (see Figure 2). This congestion –
along with the effects of operational use, structural failures, accidents involving space
systems, and irresponsible testing or employment of debris-producing destructive ASATs
– is complicating space operations for all those that seek to benefit from space.
Increased congestion was highlighted by the 2009 collision between a Russian
government Cosmos satellite and a U.S. commercial Iridium satellite. The collision
created approximately 1,500 new pieces of trackable space debris, adding to the more
than 3,000 pieces of debris created by the 2007 Chinese ASAT test. These two events
greatly increased the cataloged population of orbital debris.
Another area of increasing congestion is the radiofrequency spectrum. Demand for
radiofrequency spectrum to support worldwide satellite services is expected to grow
commensurate with the rapid expansion of satellite services and applications. As many
as 9,000 satellite communications transponders are expected to be in orbit by 2015. As
the demand for bandwidth increases and more transponders are placed in service, the
greater the probability of radiofrequency interference and the strain on international
processes to minimize that interference.
Space is increasingly contested in all orbits. Today space systems and their supporting
infrastructure face a range of man-made threats that may deny, degrade, deceive, disrupt,
or destroy assets. Potential adversaries are seeking to exploit perceived space
vulnerabilities. As more nations and non-state actors develop counterspace capabilities
over the next decade, threats to U.S. space systems and challenges to the stability and
security of the space environment will increase. Irresponsible acts against space systems
could have implications beyond the space domain, disrupting worldwide services upon
which the civil and commerical sectors depend.
Space is increasingly competitive. Although the United States still maintains an overall
edge in space capabilities, the U.S. competitive advantage has decreased as market-entry
barriers have lowered (see Figure 3). The U.S. technological lead is eroding in several
areas as expertise among other nations increases. International advances in space
technology and the associated increase in foreign availability of components have put
increased importance on the U.S. export control review process to ensure the
competitiveness of the U.S. space industrial base while also addressing national
security needs.
U.S. suppliers, especially those in the second and third tiers, are at risk due to
inconsistent acquisition and production rates, long development cycles, consolidation of
suppliers under first-tier prime contractors, and a more competitive foreign market. A
decrease in specialized suppliers further challenges U.S. abilities to maintain assured
access to critical technologies, avoid critical dependencies, inspire innovation, and
maintain leadership advantages. All of these issues are compounded by challenges in
recruiting, developing, and retaining a technical workforce.
In executing the National Space Policy, our National Security Space Strategy seeks to
maintain and enhance the national security benefits we derive from our activities and
capabilities in space while addressing and shaping the strategic environment and
strengthening the foundations of our enterprise. The U.S. defense and intelligence
communities will continue to rely on space systems for military operations, intelligence
collection, and related activities; access to these capabilities must be assured. We must
address the growing challenges of the congested, contested, and competitive space
environment while continuing our leadership in the space domain.
Our strategy is derived from the principles and goals found in the National Space Policy
and builds on the strategic approach laid out in the National Security Strategy.
Specifically, our national security space objectives are to:
• Strengthen safety, stability, and security in space;
• Maintain and enhance the strategic national security advantages afforded to the
United States by space; and
• Energize the space industrial base that supports U.S. national security.
We seek a safe space environment in which all can operate with minimal risk of
accidents, breakups, and purposeful interference. We seek a stable space environment in
which nations exercise shared responsibility to act as stewards of the space domain and
follow norms of behavior. We seek a secure space environment in which responsible
nations have access to space and the benefits of space operations without need to exercise
their inherent right of self-defense.
We seek to ensure national security access to space and use of space capabilities in peace,
crisis, or conflict. We seek to meet the needs of national leaders and intelligence and
military personnel, irrespective of degradation of the space environment or attacks on
specific systems or satellites. Enhancing these benefits requires improving the
foundational activities of our national security space enterprise – including our systems,
our acquisition processes, our industrial base, our technology innovation, and our
space professionals.
A resilient, flexible, and healthy space industrial base must underpin all of our space
activities. We seek to foster a space industrial base comprised of skilled professionals
who deliver those innovative technologies and systems that enable our competitive
advantage. Our space system developers, operators, and analysts must deliver, field, and
sustain national security space capabilities for the 21st century.
5 “To promote security and stability in space, we will pursue activities
consistent with the inherent right of self-defense, deepen cooperation
with allies and friends, and work with all nations toward the
responsible and peaceful use of space.”
- 2010 National Security Strategy
The National Security Space Strategy draws upon all elements of national power and
requires active U.S. leadership in space. The United States will pursue a set of
interrelated strategic approaches to meet our national security space objectives:
• Promote responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space;
• Provide improved U.S. space capabilities;
• Partner with responsible nations, international organizations, and
commercial firms;
• Prevent and deter aggression against space infrastructure that supports U.S.
national security; and
• Prepare to defeat attacks and to operate in a degraded environment.
Promoting Responsible, Peaceful, and Safe Use of Space
“All nations have the right to use and explore space, but with this
right also comes responsibility. The United States, therefore, calls
on all nations to work together to adopt approaches for responsible
activity in space to preserve this right for the benefit of future
generations.”
- 2010 National Space Policy
As directed in the National Space Policy, the United States will promote the responsible,
peaceful, and safe use of space as the foundational step to addressing the congested and
contested space domain and enabling other aspects of our approach. We will encourage
allies, partners, and others to do the same. As more nations, international organizations,
and commercial firms field or aspire to field space capabilities, it is increasingly
important that they act responsibly, peacefully, and safely in space. At the same time,
they must be reassured of U.S. intentions to act likewise. We will encourage responsible
behavior in space and lead by the power of our example. Moreover, U.S. diplomatic
engagements will enhance our ability to cooperate with our allies and partners and seek
common ground among all space-faring nations.
The United States will support development of data standards, best practices,
transparency and confidence-building measures, and norms of behavior for responsible
space operations. We will consider proposals and concepts for arms control measures if
hey are equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the national security of the United
States and its allies. We believe setting pragmatic guidelines for safe activity in space
can help avoid collisions and other debris-producing events, reduce radiofrequency
interference, and promote security and stability in the space domain – all of which are in
the interests of all nations.
Shared awareness of spaceflight activity must improve in order to foster global
spaceflight safety and help prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust. The United
States is the leader in space situational awareness (SSA) and can use its knowledge to
foster cooperative SSA relationships, support safe space operations, and protect U.S. and
allied space capabilities and operations.
DoD will continue to improve the quantity and quality of the SSA information it obtains
and expand provision of safety of flight services to U.S. Government agencies, other
nations, and commercial firms. DoD will encourage other space operators to share their
spaceflight safety data. DoD, in coordination with other government agencies, will seek
to establish agreements with other nations and commercial firms to maintain and improve
space object databases, pursue common international data standards and data integrity
measures, and provide services and disseminate orbital tracking information, including
predictions of space object conjunction, to enhance spaceflight safety for all parties.
Providing Improved U.S. Space Capabilities
“Being able to deliver capability cost-effectively when it is needed
improves mission effectiveness, provides leadership with flexibility in
making investments, and precludes gaps in necessary capabilities.”
- 2009 National Intelligence Strategy
U.S. space capabilities will continue to be fundamental for national security. DoD and
the IC will identify, improve, and prioritize investments in those capabilities that garner
the greatest advantages. We will develop, acquire, field, operate, and sustain space
capabilities to deliver timely and accurate space services to a variety of customers, from
soldiers to national decision-makers. We will enhance interoperability and compatibility
of existing national security systems, across operational domains and mission areas, to
maximize efficiency of our national security architecture; we will ensure these
characteristics are built into future systems. We will ensure that data collection and
products are released at the lowest possible classification to maximize their usefulness to
the user community.
Ensuring U.S. capabilities are developed and fielded in a timely, reliable, and responsive
manner is critical for national decision-makers to act on time-sensitive and accurate
information, for military forces to plan and execute effective operations, and for the IC to
enable all of the above with timely indications and warning. Improving our acquisition
processes, energizing the U.S. space industrial base, enhancing technological innovation,
and deliberately developing space professionals are critical enablers to maintaining U.S.
space leadership.
In cooperation with our industrial base partners, DoD and the IC will revalidate current
measures and implement new measures, where practicable, to stabilize program
acquisition more effectively and improve our space acquisition processes. We will
reduce programmatic risk through improved management of requirements. We will use
proven best practices of systems engineering, mission assurance, contracting, technology
maturation, cost estimating, and financial management to improve system acquisition,
reduce the risk of mission failure, and increase successful launch and operation of our
space systems.
Mission permitting, we will synchronize the planning, programming, and execution of
major acquisition programs with other DoD and IC processes to improve efficiencies and
overall performance of our acquisition system and industrial base. DoD and the IC will
evaluate the requirements and analysis of alternatives processes to ensure a range of
affordable solutions is considered and to identify requirements for possible adjustment.
The requirements process must produce combinations of material and non-material
solutions. Realistic cost and schedule estimates must inform the President’s annual
budget request. Human resources processes must provide the right personnel for
successful execution.
We seek to foster a U.S. space industrial base that is robust, competitive, flexible,
healthy, and delivers reliable space capabilities on time and on budget. DoD and the IC,
in concert with the civil space sector, will better manage investments across portfolios to
ensure the industrial base can sustain those critical technologies and skills that produce
the systems we require. Additionally, we will continue to explore a mix of capabilities
with shorter development cycles to minimize delays, cut cost growth, and enable more
rapid technology maturation, innovation, and exploitation.
A key aspect of energizing the U.S. space industrial base is to reform U.S. export controls
to address technology security and global competitiveness. Export controls have a far-
reaching impact on national security interests, as they help deter illicit efforts by others to
obtain and use the materials, technology, and know-how that are vital to our national
security. Export controls, however, can also affect the health and welfare of the
industrial base, in particular second-tier and third-tier suppliers. Reforming export
controls will facilitate U.S. firms’ ability to compete to become providers-of-choice in the
international marketplace for capabilities that are, or will soon become, widely available
globally, while strengthening our ability to protect the most significant U.S. technology
advantages. In particular, as new opportunities arise for international collaboration, a
revised export control system will better enable the domestic firms competing for these
contracts. Revised export control policies will address U.S. firms’ ability to export
space-related items generally available in the global marketplace, consistent with U.S.
policy and international commitments.
We will continue to pursue, adapt, and evolve the unique technologies, innovative
exploitation techniques, and diverse applications that give the United States its strategic
advantage in space. The United States seeks to maintain and enhance access to those
global and domestic technologies needed for national security space systems. We will do
so by expanding technology partnerships with the academic community, industry, U.S.
and partner governments, mission customers, and other centers of technical excellence
and innovation, consistent with U.S. policy, technology transfer objectives, and
international commitments. To advance the science and technology that enables U.S.
space capabilities, we will continue to assess global technology trends to find emerging
technologies and potential breakthroughs. We will explore new applications of current
technologies and the development of unique, innovative technologies and capabilities.
We will improve the transition of scientific research and technology development to the
operational user and into major system acquisition. To the extent practicable, we will
also facilitate the incorporation of these capabilities and technologies into appropriate
domestic space programs.
People are our greatest asset. To support the range of national security space activities,
we will develop current and future national security space professionals – our “space
cadre” – who can acquire capabilities, operate systems, analyze information, and succeed
in a congested, contested, and competitive environment. We will build a more diverse
and balanced workforce among military, civilian, and contractor components. These
professionals must be educated, experienced, and trained in the best practices of their
field – whether it is planning, programming, acquisition, manufacturing, operations, or
analysis.
We will continue to encourage students at all levels to pursue technical coursework as a
foundation for space-related career fields. Working with other departments and agencies,
we will synchronize our science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM)
education initiatives with sound education investments to ensure an ample supply of
space professionals with appropriate skills and capabilities. We will encourage our space
professionals to participate in STEM outreach and mentoring programs.
We will continue to develop structured personnel development programs to expand,
track, and sustain our space expertise, employing focused education and training as well
as purposeful utilization of our people to offer a broad range of experiential opportunities.
We will further professional development by growing, rewarding, and retaining scientific
and technical expertise and professional leadership. We will support an entrepreneurial
ethos by encouraging initiative, innovation, collaboration, resourcefulness, and resilience.
As national security space priorities shift, we will continue to educate and train the
workforce to align with new priorities.
Partnering with Responsible Nations, International Organizations, and
Commercial Firms
“[E]xplore opportunities to leverage growing international and
commercial expertise to enhance U.S. capabilities and reduce the
vulnerability of space systems and their supporting ground
infrastructure.”
- 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review
The evolving strategic environment allows for additional opportunities to partner with
responsible nations, international organizations, and commercial firms. DoD and the IC
will continue to partner with others to augment the U.S. national security space posture
across many mission areas. This includes looking for opportunities to leverage or work
in conjunction with partnerships pursued by U.S. Government civil space agencies. By
sharing or exchanging capabilities, data, services, personnel, operations, and technology,
we can ensure access to information and services from a more diverse set of systems – an
advantage in a contested space environment. We will promote appropriate cost-sharing
and risk-sharing partnerships to develop and share capabilities. Decisions on partnering
will be consistent with U.S. policy and international commitments and consider cost,
protection of sources and methods, and effects on the U.S. industrial base.
Partnering with other nations also is essential to ensuring global access to the
radiofrequency spectrum and related orbital assignments and promoting the responsible,
peaceful, and safe use of outer space. Nations gain international acceptance of their use
of the radiofrequency spectrum and satellite orbits through the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU). Registering satellite networks with the ITU can help
prevent and, if necessary, address radiofrequency interference.
The United States will lead in building coalitions of like-minded space-faring nations
and, where appropriate, work with international institutions to do so. With our allies, we
will explore the development of combined space doctrine with principles, goals, and
objectives that, in particular, endorse and enable the collaborative sharing of space
capabilities in crisis and conflict. We will seek to expand mutually beneficial agreements
with key partners to utilize existing and planned capabilities that can augment U.S.
national security space capabilities. We will pursue increased interoperability,
compatibility, and integration of partner nations into appropriate DoD and IC networks to
support information sharing and collective endeavors, taking affordability and mutual
benefit into account. At the same time, U.S. military and intelligence personnel will
ensure the appropriate review and release of classified information to enhance partner
access to space information.
We will actively promote the sale of U.S.-developed capabilities to partner nations and
the integration of those capabilities into existing U.S. architectures and networks.
Posturing our domestic industry to develop these systems will also enable the
competitiveness of the U.S. industrial base.
We will explore sharing space-derived information as “global utilities” with partnered
nations. As we do today with the positioning, navigation, and timing services of the
Global Positioning System, we will provide services derived from selected space systems
and enhance those services through partnerships. We will continue to share SSA
information to promote responsible and safe space operations. We will also pursue
enhanced sharing of other space services such as missile warning and maritime domain
awareness. We may seek to establish a collaborative missile warning network to detect
attacks against our interests and those of our allies and partners.
Strategic partnerships with commercial firms will continue to enable access to a more
diverse, robust, and distributed set of space systems and provide easily releasable data.
Strategic partnerships with commercial firms will be pursued in areas that both stabilize
costs and improve the resilience of space architectures upon which we rely. Innovative
approaches will be explored for their utility in meeting government performance
requirements in a cost-effective and timely manner. We will rely on proven commercial
capabilities to the maximum extent practicable, and we will modify commercial
capabilities to meet government requirements when doing so is more cost-effective and
timely for the government. We will develop space systems only when there is no
suitable, cost-effective commercial alternative or when national security needs dictate.
Preventing and Deterring Aggression against Space Infrastructure that
Supports U.S. National Security
“U.S. forces must be able to deter, defend against, and defeat
aggression by potentially hostile nation-states. This capability is
fundamental to the nation’s ability to protect its interests and to
provide security in key regions.”
- 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review
Given the degree to which the United States relies on space systems and supporting
infrastructure for national security, we must use a multilayered approach to prevent and
deter aggression. We seek to enhance our national capability to dissuade and deter the
development, testing, and employment of counterspace systems and prevent and deter
aggression against space systems and supporting infrastructure that support U.S.
national security.
Many elements of this strategy contribute to this approach. We will: support diplomatic
efforts to promote norms of responsible behavior in space; pursue international
partnerships that encourge potential adversary restraint; improve our ability to attribute
attacks; strengthen the resilience of our architectures to deny the benefits of an attack;
and retain the right to respond, should deterrence fail.
DoD and the IC will support the diplomatic and public diplomacy efforts of the
Department of State to promote the responsible use of space and discourage activities that
threaten the safety, stability, and security of the space domain. We will also work with
the Department of State and other appropriate U.S. Government agencies to strengthen
alliances with other space-faring nations and pursue partnerships with commercial firms
and international organizations.
We will improve our intelligence posture – predictive awareness, characterization,
warning, and attribution – to better monitor and attribute activities in the space domain.
Thus, SSA and foundational intelligence will continue to be top priorities, as they
underpin our ability to maintain awareness of natural disturbances and the capabilities,
activities, and intentions of others. We will also enable and develop intelligence
professionals who can provide greater scope, depth, and quality of intelligence collection
and analysis.
We will seek to deny adversaries meaningful benefits of attack by improving cost-
effective protection and strengthening the resilience of our architectures. Partnerships
with other nations, commercial firms, and international organizations, as well as
alternative U.S. Government approaches such as cross-domain solutions, hosted
payloads, responsive options, and other innovative solutions, can deliver capability,
should our space systems be attacked. This also will enable our ability to operate in a
degraded space environment.
Finally, the United States will retain the right and capabilities to respond in self-defense,
should deterrence fail. We will use force in a manner that is consistent with longstanding
principles of international law, treaties to which the United States is a party, and the
inherent right of self defense.
Preparing to Defeat Attacks and Operate in a Degraded Environment
“Increase assurance and resilience of mission-essential functions
enabled by commercial, civil, scientific, and national security
spacecraft and supporting infrastructure against disruption,
degradation, and destruction, whether from environmental,
mechanical, electronic, or hostile causes.”
- 2010 National Space Policy
We believe it is in the interests of all space-faring nations to avoid hostilities in space.
In spite of this, some actors may still believe counterspace actions could provide
military advantage. Our military and intelligence capabilities must be prepared to “fight
through” a degraded environment and defeat attacks targeted at our space systems
and supporting infrastructure. We must deny and defeat an adversary’s ability to achieve
its objectives.
As we invest in next generation space capabilities and fill gaps in current capabilities, we
will include resilience as a key criterion in evaluating alternative architectures.
Resilience can be achieved in a variety of ways, to include cost-effective space system
protection, cross-domain solutions, hosting payloads on a mix of platforms in various
orbits, drawing on distributed international and commercial partner capabilities, and
developing and maturing responsive space capabilities. We will develop the most
feasible, mission-effective, and fiscally sound mix of these alternatives.
To make the most effective use of space protection resources, we will identify and
prioritize protection for vital space missions supporting national security requirements.
We will implement cost-effective protection commensurate with threat, system use, and
impact of loss – applied to each segment of our space systems and supporting
infrastructure.
To enhance resilience, we will continue to develop mission-effective alternatives,
including land, sea, air, space, and cyber-based alternatives for critical capabilities
currently delivered primarily through space-based platforms. In addition, we will
seek to establish relationships and agreements whereby we can access partner
capabilities if U.S. systems are degraded or unavailable. We will be prepared to
use these capabilities to ensure the timely continuity of services in a degraded
space environment.
Preparing for attacks must extend to the people and processes relying on space
information, operating our space systems, and analyzing space-derived information. We
will improve the ability of U.S. military and intelligence agencies to operate in a denied
or degraded space environment through focused education, training, and exercises and
through new doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).
Consistent with the guidance provided by the President in the National Space Policy,
DoD and the IC will implement the National Security Space Strategy by using it to
inform future planning, programming, acquisition, operations, and analysis guidance.
DoD and the IC will work with other U.S. Government agencies and departments, as well
as foreign governments and commercial partners, to update, balance, and integrate all of
the tools of U.S. power. We will evolve policies, strategies, and doctrine pertaining to
national security space.
Implementation plans will be developed based on feasibility and affordability
assessments and cost, benefit, and risk analyses. Further, the impact of plans on
manning, operations, and programs will be understood prior to implementation. As
stated in the National Security Strategy, our ability to achieve long-term goals for space
depends upon our fiscal responsibility and making tough choices, such as between
capability and survivability.
IMPLEMENTATION
“Our national security strategy is, therefore, focused on renewing
American leadership so that we can more effectively advance our
interests in the 21st century. We will do so by building on the sources
of our strength at home, while shaping an international order that can
meet the challenges of our time.”
- 2010 National Security Strategy
The United States will retain leadership in space by strengthening our posture at home
and collaborating with others worldwide. Just as U.S. national security is built upon
maintaining strategic advantages, it is also increasingly predicated on active U.S.
leadership of alliance and coalition efforts in peacetime, crisis, and conflict.
Active U.S. leadership in space requires a whole-of-government approach that integrates
all elements of national power, from technological prowess and industrial capacity to
alliance building and diplomatic engagement. Leadership cannot be predicated on
declaratory policy alone. It must build upon a willingness to maintain strategic
advantages while working with the international community to develop collective norms,
share information, and collaborate on capabilities.
U.S. leadership in space can help the United States and our partners address the
challenges posed by a space domain that is increasingly congested, contested, and
competitive. Our strategy seeks to address this new environment through its set of
interrelated approaches:
• We seek to address congestion by establishing norms, enhancing space situational
awareness, and fostering greater transparency and information sharing. Our
words and deeds should reassure our allies and the world at large of our intent to
act peacefully and responsibly in space and encourage others to do
the same.
• We seek to address the contested environment with a multilayered deterrence
approach. We will support establishing international norms and transparency and
confidence-building measures in space, primarily to promote spaceflight safety
but also to dissuade and impose international costs on aggressive behavior. We
will improve and protect vital U.S. space capabilities while using interoperability,
compatibility, and integration to create coalitions and alliances of responsible
space-faring nations. We will improve our capability to attribute attacks and seek
to deny meaningful operational benefits from such attacks. We will retain the
right and capabilities to respond in self-defense, should deterrence fail.
• We seek to address competition by enhancing our own capabilities, improving our
acquisition processes, fostering a healthy U.S. industrial base, and strengthening
collaboration and cooperation.
CONCLUSION – A NEW TYPE OF LEADERSHIP
Our objectives are to improve safety, stability, and security in space; to maintain and
enhance the strategic national security advantages afforded to the United States by space;
and to energize the space industrial base that supports U.S. national security. Achieving
these objectives will mean not only that our military and intelligence communities can
continue to use space for national security purposes, but that a community of nations is
working toward creating a sustainable and peaceful space environment to benefit the
world for years to come.
